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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
On December 20, 2010, the District Court orally granted Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss. (R389) On January 31, 2011, the District Court issued its Ruling and Order
Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
with prejudice. (Addendum at 12-14 (hereinafter "Add._"); R397-399) This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether a health care provider owes a duty of care to the children of a

woman murdered by the health care provider's patient, when the complaint alleges
that the health care provider's negligence in prescribing incorrect psychiatric
medication was a proximate cause of the patient's violent conduct.
The issue was the subject of a Motion for to Dismiss, which is reviewed under a
correctness standard, with no deference to the trial court's decision. Wagner v. Clifton,
2002 UT 109, \ 8, 62 P.3d 440. Plaintiffs filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R402-404),
which preserved this error for appeal. Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II.

Whether a guilty plea to a murder charge by Plaintiffs' father for

killing Plaintiffs' mother collaterally estops Plaintiffs from litigating the question of
whether the medications prescribed by Defendants were a proximate cause of their
father's violent conduct.
The District Court ruled in Plaintiffs favor on this issue. Plaintiffs list it as an
issue for view in the event Defendants argue that this is an alternative ground for
affirmance. If Defendants raise the issue, it was the subject of Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment, and would therefore be reviewed for correctness, with all facts and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, % 13, 63 P.3d 705.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions central to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The facts are simple but profoundly tragic. David Ragsdale went for psychiatric
care to defendant Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic in Draper, where he was treated
by Defendant Trina West ("Nurse West"), an advanced family nurse practitioner. Nurse
West was soon prescribing a cocktail of seven drugs, including psycho stimulants,
tranquilizers, antidepressants and steroids. David displayed toxic side effects from these
medications prior to his last visit with Nurse West.
On January 6, 2008, Mr. Ragsdale shot Kristy Ragsdale, his wife and Plaintiffs'
mother, thirteen times, in broad daylight, in the parking lot of a church, in front of
multiple witnesses. Mr. Ragsdale subsequently pled guilty to murder, stating at his
sentencing hearing that, while guilty, he believed he would not have committed the
murder had he not been taking the drugs prescribed by Nurse West.
This case is brought by William M. Jeffs, the guardian of the Ragsdales' children,
who are now left with no mother, and a father in prison for life. The Amended
Complaint alleges that the medications were not appropriate for this patient, that Nurse
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West failed to consult with a physician as required by statute, and that the medications
were a proximate cause of Mr. Ragsdale's violent outburst.
The District Court granted Defendants5 Motions to Dismiss, ruling that even if
Defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of Mr. Ragsdale's violent outburst,
Defendants owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs because a health care provider owes a duty
of care only to a patient. Since Mr. Ragsdale was Defendants' patient, not his children,
Plaintiffs could not bring a tort claim of any kind. (Add. 13)
Defendants argued in the alternative that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
Mr. Ragsdale's guilty plea to a charge of murder foreclosed his children from litigating
the question of whether the drugs prescribed by Defendants were a proximate cause of
Mr. Ragsdale's violent outburst. The District Court stated that were it to have reached
this issue, it would have rejected this argument because Plaintiffs were not a party to the
criminal proceeding. (Add. 13)
The Course Of Proceedings And Disposition In The District Court
Mr. Ragsdale's children, through their Conservator William Jeffs, filed this
lawsuit on April 19, 2010. (Rl-15) An Amended Complaint was filed on April 30, 2010
(Add. 1-11; R19-29). The Amended Complaint alleges negligence against Defendant
West ("Nurse West") based on her improper treatment of David Ragsdale (Count I),
negligence against Defendant Dr. Rodier for his failure to consult with Nurse West or
monitor in any way the treatment she was providing Mr. Ragsdale (Count II), and
liability against Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic for the negligence of its
employees, Nurse West and Dr. Rodier. (Count III). (Add.6-10)
3

On May 28, 2011, Defendant West filed a Motion to Dismiss and Alternative
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R37-113) The Motion to Dismiss argued that no duty
of care was owed to Plaintiffs, and the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment argued
that Mr. Ragsdale's guilty plea in his criminal proceeding collaterally estopped Plaintiffs
from litigating whether the drugs prescribed by Defendants were a proximate cause of his
conduct. Defendants Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and Rodier joined in
Defendant West's Motion. (Rl 14-117; R218-219).
On December 20, 2010, Judge Lindberg orally granted the Motion to Dismiss,
ruling that Defendants did not owe Plaintiffs a duty as a matter of law. (Add.26-27)
Judge Lindberg also stated that, were the court to have reached the alternative Motion for
Summary Judgment, it would have rejected the argument that Plaintiffs' claims were
barred by collateral estoppel. A written order was entered on January 31, 2011.
(Add.12-14) This appeal was timely filed on February 4, 2011. (R402-404)
Statement Of Facts
The Amended Complaint alleges that on or about April 16, 2007, David Ragsdale
began a regular course of treatment at the Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic with
defendant Trina West ("Nurse West"), an advanced family nurse practitioner. (Add.3 at
112) Nurse West began by prescribing two powerful steroids, both of which have a risk
of causing psychiatric complications. (Add.3 atfflf13-14)
At subsequent visits, Nurse West increased the dosages of the steroids, and added
a prescription for Concerta, the brand name for the psycho stimulant drug
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methylphenidate. (Add.3 at ff 18, 21-22). Nurse West subsequently doubled the dosage
of Concerta, and later added prescriptions for additional drugs. (Add.4 at 127, 30)
Nurse practitioners are required to "consult" with a physician when prescribing
Schedule II and III drugs. Utah Code Ann. §58-31b-502(15). Two of the drugs Nurse
West prescribed for Mr. Ragsdale, Concerta and Testosterone, fall into this category.
The Amended Complaint alleges, however, that at no time did Nurse West consult
defendant Dr. Rodier or any other doctor. (Add.3 at ^ 17; Add.4 at ^f 24, 27) Indeed,
although never ruled upon, Dr. Rodier separately moved for summary judgment, arguing
that he could not be liable because he never spoke to Nurse West about Mr. Ragsdale.
(R330-360)
On December 21, 2007, Mr. Ragsdale informed Nurse West that he was having
marital problems and that a restraining order had been entered against him by his wife,
Kristy Ragsdale. (Add.4 at ^ 28) After this visit, however, David Ragsdale was
simultaneously taking the following combination of drugs based on prescriptions from
Nurse West, all without the involvement of a physician (Add.4 at ^f 30):
•
•
•
•
•

The psychostimulant Concerta
The tranquilizer Valium
The antidepressant Doxepin
The antidepressant Paxil
The steroid Pregnenolone

• The steroid Testosterone
On January 8, 2008, with all of these drugs in his system, David Ragsdale shot and
killed his wife, Kristy Ragsdale. (Add.5 at f 31, 33) The Amended Complaint alleges
that there was no medical justification for prescribing this mixture of drugs in the dosages
5

prescribed by Nurse West, and that these drugs were a direct, proximate, and foreseeable
cause of David Ragsdale's violent outburst. (Add.6,7 at ^ 35)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Did Defendants owe a duty of care? As is often the case in challenging tort
claims, the key issue is whether Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty of care. Defendants
Motion to Dismiss did not question the adequacy of Plaintiffs' allegations of negligence
or proximate causation. The question is whether a health care provider owes a duty of
care to those injured by a patient, when the allegation is that the health care provider was
a cause of the patient inflicting those injuries.
Critical to this inquiry is the fact is that Defendants' negligence was an affirmative
act; in this case, prescribing drugs that are alleged to have been a cause of Mr. Ragsdale
violent outburst. The typical case against health care provider arising out of the violent
acts of a patient alleges inaction; typically, a failure to warn or restrain an individual that
the health care provider has reason to know may become violent. That Defendants here
are alleged to have been a cause of their patient's violent conduct, not merely that they
failed to prevent it, is a unique fact and critical from an analytical point of view because
tort law is more apt to find a duty of care when affirmative acts are involved as opposed
to a failure to act. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5 ed. 1984), §56 at 378
("When we cross the line into the field of 'misfeasance,' liability is far easier to find").
Defendants first argued for an absolute rule that only a patient is owed a duty of
care. The District Court agreed, ruling that only a patient can bring a negligence claim
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against a health care provider, and since Plaintiffs were not Defendants' patients, they
have no cause of action.
That ruling, however, misses abundant authority in both case law and the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act that there is no such rule. If an injury is foreseeable, a
health care provider, like any other person, owes a duty of care. The District Court was
persuaded to limit negligence actions against health care providers to patients by two
appellate court decisions that ruled that plaintiffs who were not patients of a doctor could
not bring a claim against the doctor. Those two decisions, however, dealt with situations
in which an employer hires a doctor to test employees for the employer's benefit, not the
employee. The ruling that in those situations the employees are not owed a duty of care
by the doctor does not support a broad rule that health care providers never owe a duty to
third-parties injured by their patients.
Defendants also argued that a duty of care to those injured by a patient arises only
where there is a special relationship between the health care provider and the injured
party. (The District Court did not reach this issue.) This Court, however, ruled in Webb
v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, 125 P.3d 906, that a special relationship is required
only for cases based on omissions, or against governmental employees. Since this case
alleges affirmative acts, by private individuals, no special relationship need be shown.
Does collateral estoppel apply? Defendants argued, in the alternative, that Mr.
Ragsdale's guilty plea to a charge of murder collaterally estops Plaintiffs from litigating
the question of whether the drugs prescribed by Defendants were a cause of Mr.
Ragsdale's conduct. Assuming Defendants assert this as an alternative basis for
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affirmance, Plaintiffs will demonstrate that collateral estoppel applies in a subsequent
proceeding only against those who were parties to the first proceeding. Since Plaintiffs
were not parties to the criminal case against Mr. Ragsdale, there is no collateral estoppel.
ARGUMENT
I.

Defendants Owed Plaintiffs A Duty Of Care
Introduction
Determining whether a defendant owes a duty of care is a question of law.

Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2009 UT 44, ^ 17, 215 P.3d 152. "A duty, in
negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition
and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another." Id. at \ 19. It
is, as this Court has characterized it, "the product of policy judgments applied to
relationships." Id.
The most critical fact in this case is that Defendants' negligence consists of
affirmative conduct. The core allegation of the Amended Complaint is that the drugs
prescribed by Nurse West were not only inappropriate for this patient, they were a
foreseeable cause of the patient's violent conduct. This allegation affects the duty
analysis in two regards. First, the alleged negligence involves the failure to choose the
right course of treatment, which goes to the very heart of the professional responsibility
of a health care provider. There are many cases both in Utah and elsewhere in which
courts limit the circumstances in which a duty is imposed on health care providers
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concerning the injuries inflicted by their patients,1 but in virtually all of those cases, the
health care provider prescribed the proper treatment, and is alleged only to have failed to
warn potential victims, or to have restrained the patient in some way. Finding a duty in
those circumstances imposes an extra layer of responsibility on a health care provider
who has chosen the right course of treatment. No such extra responsibility is sought to be
imposed here. Imposing a duty here requires only that health care providers choose a
medically acceptable course of treatment.
The second reason this core allegation is critical is because tort law has long
distinguished between malfeasance and nonfeasance, showing a much greater reluctance
to find the existence of a duty when the negligence is a failure to act. Good
samaritanship may be applauded, but it is generally not legally required. This distinction
between malfeasance and a failure to act reflects a basic philosophical underpinning of
our legal system:
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more
fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, between
active misconduct working positive injury to others and passive inaction, a
failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm
not created by any wrongful act of the defendant. This distinction is
founded on that attitude of extreme individualism so typical of anglo-saxon
legal thought.
Philip W. Romohr, A Right/duty Perspective on the Legal and Philosophical Foundations
oftheNo-Duty-to-RescueRule,

55 Duke LJ. 1025, 1030-31 (2006) {quoting Bohlen, The

Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. Pa. L. Rev. 217 (1908)).

See, 1 Am. Law Med. Malp. §3:16, Duty owed to nonpatient third parties.
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There is no such reluctance to impose a duty when the defendant is alleged to have
affirmatively acted in a way that increased the likelihood of harm. As bluntly stated in
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5 ed. 1984), §56 at 378: When we cross the
line into the field of 'misfeasance/ liability is far easier to find."2
Putting aside the malfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, this Court has emphasized
the following factors as central in determining whether a duty of care is owed to a
particular plaintiff:
A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the
law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of
conduct toward another, [citation omitted] A court determines whether a
duty exists by analyzing the legal relationship between the parties, the
foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which
party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other general
policy considerations, [citation omitted] Legal duty, then, is the product of
policy judgments applied to relationships.
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., supra at % 19.

2

See also, Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo. 1987) ("In determining
whether a defendant owes a duty ... the law has long recognized a distinction between
action and a failure to act"); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 357
(Tenn. 2008) ("With regard to misfeasance, this Court has held that 'all persons have a
duty to use reasonable care to refrain from conduct that will foreseeably cause injury to
others.' ... As for nonfeasance, Tennessee's courts generally have declined to impose a
duty to act or to rescue"); Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 429 Mich. 495,
498, 418 N.W.2d 381, 382 (1988) ("In determining standards of conduct in the area of
negligence, the courts have made a distinction between misfeasance, or active
misconduct causing personal injury, and nonfeasance, which is passive inaction or the
failure to actively protect others from harm"); Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors, 97 Cal.
App. 4th 1193, 1202, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160, 166 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("a distinction is
drawn between claims of liability based upon misfeasance and those based upon
nonfeasance").
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Defendants focused less on these factors, however, than on two points they argue
preclude finding a duty: (1) the lack of a health care provider/patient relationship, and (2)
the lack of a "special relationship." Plaintiffs will examine these two issues, therefore,
before returning the Normandeau factors.
A.

Non-patients can bring negligence actions.

The District Court ruled Plaintiffs could not "step into the shoes" of David
Ragsdale, Defendants' patient. (Add. 13) To refute this, one need look no farther than
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (UT 1993), a case in which this Court
permitted a claim against, among others, a physician, by the victim of an attack by a
mental patient. Although the Court undertook a careful analysis of the requirements for
asserting a failure to warn claim in these circumstances, the fact that the victim was not
the defendant's patient was not even an issue.
Courts also routinely permit actions by the family members of those aggrieved by
a health care provider's negligence. E.g., Jensen v. IHC Hospital, Inc., 314 Utah Adv.
Rep. 24, 944 P.2d 327 (UT 1997) (patient's family brought wrongful death action based
on defendant's malpractice). Under the District Court's absolute rule, such actions would
not be pei^nissible.

3

Several other decisions by this Court have ruled that claims by the victims of an attack
by mental patient were not permitted (these cases are discussed in Section B, below), but
none did so based on a rule that only patients can sue health care providers. See, Ferree
v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (UT 1989) (no claim for failure to warn because there was
no reason to suspect violence); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (UT 1991) (no duty to
protect because no "special relationship" with plaintiff); Wilson v. Valley Mental Health,
969 P.2d 416 (UT 1998) (no duty to warn because no "special relationship").
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The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also demonstrates that people other than
patients can bring actions against doctors. The Act's statute of limitations provides that
claims must be brought within "two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers" the
malpractice.4 Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404. Similarly, the Nurse Practice Act Rule
provides that nurses must "take preventive measures to protect patient, others, and self."
R156-31b-704(2)(o) (emphasis added).5 Thus, multiple statutes contemplate actions
against health care providers by non-patients.
The District Court was likely swayed by two appellate court decision cited by
Defendants, Wilcox v. Salt Lake City, 484 P.2d 1200, 26 Utah 2d 78 (1971), and Joseph
v. McCann, 2006 UT App 459, 147 P.3d 547. Both dealt with the situation in which
doctors are hired by an employer or government agency to conduct examinations of
applicants for the benefit of the employer or government agency. Because the doctors
were hired by the employer or government agency, the exam was conducted solely for
the benefit of that entity. The courts consequently held that the person being examined
was not the doctor's patient, and thus the doctor owed no duty to that person. In Wilcox,
for example, the city hired doctors to examine those applying for waitresses' permits to

4

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also provides that in order to bring an action
based on lack of informed consent, a plaintiff must show "that a provider-patient
relationship existed between the patient and health care provider." Utah Code Ann §78B3-406. Because the Act specifically requires such a relationship as one element of this
kind of claim (which is not involved here), by implication a provider-patient relationship
is not required for other kinds of malpractice actions.
5

In Osborne v. United States, 166 F.Supp. 2d 479, 499 (S.D.W. Va. 2001), the court held
that third-part actions against doctors were permitted under West Virginia law because
the medical malpractice statute provided for claims by "persons," not just "patients."
12

see if they met the qualifications for a permit. In Joseph, the city hired doctors to
examine police officers to determine their fitness for duty. In both cases, the court held
that the only duty the doctors had was the contractual duty they owed to the entity that
hired them. As the Court in Joseph summed up the principle being applied {Joseph,
supra at1! 15):
a physician who is retained by a third party to conduct an examination of
another person and report the results to that third party does not enter in a
physician-patient relationship with the examinee and is not liable to the
examinee for any losses he suffers as a result of the conclusions the
physician reaches or reports.
Defendants seized on statements in those decisions - that you need a physician
patient relationship to create a duty - that were intended to deal with the specific situation
of a third-party hiring doctors to conduct medical examinations for the benefit of the third
party. The lack of a physician-patient relationship when a doctor is hired by a third-party
is dispositive in those situations because the person being examined would have no basis
for claiming that the doctor owed him or her a duty. These decisions were never intended
to create a general rule that only patients can sue doctors, and they have never been cited
for that proposition.6

The rule stated in Joseph and Wilcox is consistent with the rule in virtually all other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Rand v. Miller, 185 W. Va. 705, 707, 408 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1991)
("where a physician is hired by an employer to conduct a physical examination of an
actual or prospective employee, ordinarily there is no professional relationship upon
which to base a medical malpractice claim by such employee"). Yet, we are aware of no
jurisdiction applying this rule to generally bar claims against doctors by non-patients.
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Nor would the rule suggested by the District Court make any sense. Consider the
situation in which a doctor negligently prescribes medication to someone about to drive a
car and the medication causes the driver to crash and injure third parties. Under
Defendants suggested interpretation of Wilcox and Joseph, those injured by the impaired
driver would have no cause of action because they were not the doctor's patients. While
there is no case on this type of situation in Utah, courts in many other jurisdictions have
held that health care providers owe a duty to someone injured by an automobile driven by
an impaired patient. See, e.g., Taylor v. Smith, 892 So.2d 887 (Ala. 2004); Osborne v.
United States, 166 F.Supp.2d 479, 499 (S.D.W. Va. 2001) ("It was foreseeable and
known also that this known alcohol and drug abuser, who routinely disregarded warnings
given by health care professionals, would operate a motor vehicle while impaired");
Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 515, 775 P.2d 713, 717 (1989) ("we find Dr.
Straight owed a duty to the driving public when he administered these drugs to Helen
Medina under these particular circumstances").
Similarly, what if a health care provider negligently allowed a patient with a
highly communicable disease to mingle in the general population? Surely the health care
provider owes a duty to third-parties that would be infected by his or her patient. E.g.,
DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 525 Pa. 558, 561-62, 583 A.2d 422, 424
(1990) ("When a physician treats a patient who has been exposed to or who has

7

See, 43 A.L.R.4th 153, Liability of physician, for injury to or death of third party, due to
failure to disclose driving-related impediment.
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contracted a communicable and/or contagious disease, it is imperative that the physician
give his or her patient the proper advice about preventing the spread of the disease").
In sum, the absolute rule imposed by the District Court finds no support in
precedent or in sensible public policy.
B.

Plaintiffs were not required to allege a "special relationship/'

Defendants argued below that no duty could exist unless Plaintiffs showed a
"special relationship" between Defendants and Plaintiffs. (R51,52) The argument is
based on a series of decisions issued by this Court between 1986 and 2002 on what
constitutes the "special relationship" necessary to impose a duty of care in certain
situations. See, Beech v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (UT 1986); Perree v. Utah,
784 P.2d 149 (UT 1989); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (UT 1991); Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 331 (UT 1993); Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 353 Utah Adv.
Rep. 28, 969 P.2d 416 (UT 1998); and Young v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2002 UT 64,
52P.3dl230.
Of these cases, Ferree, Rollins, Higgins, and Wilson involved claims against
health care providers or prison officials by those injured as a result of violent acts by
mental patients or criminals. Defendants relied heavily on these decisions in arguing that
Plaintiffs' claim fails because Defendants had no "special relationship" with Plaintiffs.
The "special relationship" argument, however, does not hold up in light of this
Court's ruling in Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, 125 P.3d 906. In Webb, this

o

The District Court did not reach this issue. We address it in the event Defendants raise
it as an alternative ground for affirmance.
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Court untangled the dual use of the term "special relationship" as used in determining
whether a defendant owes a duty of care. In cases against private individuals, the
plaintiff has to show a "special relationship" only where a claim is based on an omission
or a failure to act (Id. at ^f 10):
The court of appeals correctly observed that as a general proposition of tort
law, the distinction between acts and omissions is central to assessing
whether a duty is owed a plaintiff Webb, 2004 UT App 56, If 6 n. 3, 88
P.3d 364, see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302 (1965). In almost
every instance, an act carries with it a potential duty and resulting legal
accountability for that act. By contrast, an omission or failure to act can
generally give rise to liability only in the presence of some external
circumstance - a special relationship.
Claims against government officials are treated differently because the role of
government is to protect the public, and governmental actors need more protection. The
courts hold, therefore, that governmental actors are not normally liable to the general
public for their actions (Id. at f 11):
As a matter of public policy, we do not expose governmental actors to tort
liability for all mishaps that may befall the public in the course of
conducting their duties, [citation omitted] Doing otherwise would have the
likely effect of reducing the pool of potential public servants. Our search
for sound public policy has led us, however, to decide that governmental
actors should be answerable in tort when their negligent conduct causes
injury to persons who stand so far apart from the general public that we can
describe them as having a special relationship to the governmental actor.
The term "special relationship," therefore, has two uses. In claims against the
government, a special relationship is always required because the governmental actors do
not have a duty to the general public. In claims against private individuals, a special
relationship is necessary if the claim is based on omission, which yet again reflects of the
critical distinction malfeasance and nonfeasance. See, e.g., Zelig v. County of Los

16

Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1129, 45 P.3d 1171, 1183 (Cal. 2002) ("[A] duty [to warn]
may arise if '(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special
relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.'
... 'This rule derives from the common law's distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance, and its reluctance to impose liability for the latter'").
Under Webb, the "special relationship" analysis in this case is quite simple. The
Amended Complaint alleges affirmative acts of negligence, not omissions, by private
actors, not governmental officials. Defendants, private health care providers, are alleged
to have negligently prescribed medications, which were a cause of Mr. Ragsdale's violent
outburst. Under Webb, therefore, there is no need to allege or prove the existence of a
special relationship between Defendants and Plaintiffs.
The Webb distinction between acts and omissions for claims against private
individuals is one deeply rooted in tort law. As explained in Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984), §56 at 373-73:
In the determination of the existence of a duty, there runs through much of
the law a distinction between action and inaction. ... The reason for the
distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by "misfeasance" the defendant
has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by "nonfeasance" he
has at least made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit
him by interfering in his affairs
Liability for "misfeasance," then, may
extend to any person to whom harm may reasonably be anticipated as a
result of defendant's conduct, or perhaps even beyond; while for
"nonfeasance it is necessary to find some definite relation between the
parties, of such a character that social policy justifies the imposition of a
duty to act.
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The Webb decision shows why this Court's prior cases involving claims arising
out of injuries inflicted by mental patients are inapplicable. Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149
(UT 1989), Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (UT 1991), mdHiggins v. Salt Lake
County, 855 P.2d 231 (UT 1993), were claims against governmental entities or actors.
Consistent with the holding in Webb, those plaintiffs were obligated to show a "special
relationship" between the defendant governmental entity and the victim, rather than just a
foreseeable risk of harm.
The only case against a non-governmental defendant, Wilson v. Valley Mental
Health, 969 P.2d 416 (UT 1998), involved a negligence claim by relatives of a murder
victim against a mental health hospital based on a failure to warn and failure to properly
restrain a violent individual. Since that case was based on an alleged failure to act, this
Court held, consistent with its later holding in Webb, that there could be no negligence
because there was no special relationship between the patient and the victim.9
9

Even if, contrary to the holding in Webb, Plaintiffs were required to allege a "special
relationship," the Amended Complaint would satisfy that requirement. In Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (UT 1993), an individual stabbed by a mentally ill patient
sued the public mental health facility for negligence. The Court found an issue of fact on
whether there was a special relationship because there is the requisite "special
relationship" if the defendant knows that the patient is likely to harm persons reasonably
identifiable either individually or as members of a group (Id. at 238):
it must be shown that the custodian knew or should have known that unless
steps were taken to protect others from the detainee, he or she was "likely"
to cause bodily harm to persons who were "reasonably identifiable by the
custodian either individually or as members of a distinct group."
Cont'd.
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In sum, Plaintiffs' claim is not subject to the "special relationship" requirement.
C.

The Normandeau factors show that
Defendants owed a duty of care.

Once the "only a patient can sue" and "special relationship" arguments are
eliminated, there remains the question of whether a duty should be imposed on the health
care providers under the facts of this case. This Court has repeatedly held that whether a
duty exists must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Among the factors to be considered
are the following:
A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the
law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of
conduct toward another, [citation omitted] A court determines whether a
duty exists by analyzing the legal relationship between the parties, the
foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which
party can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other general
policy considerations, [citation omitted] Legal duty, then, is the product of
policy judgments applied to relationships.
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2009 UT 44, f 19, 215 P.3d 152.
The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint make a compelling case for the
existence of a duty under these factors.
The "legal relationship between the parties:" Defendants were heath care
providers treating Plaintiffs' father, David Ragsdale, during a time when Defendants
A duty makes sense in these situations, the Court observed, because (Id):
the identification of a victim and a means has made it feasible for the
custodian to take concrete steps to prevent the harm.
The Amended Complaint alleges that Kristy Ragsdale had secured a protective
order against David Ragsdale, and that Defendants were aware of this. Thus, Kristy
Ragsdale was a "reasonably identifiable" potential victim, creating a "special
relationship" if such is required to establish a duty.
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knew that there were serious marital problems between their patient and his estranged
wife (Plaintiffs' mother). The marital problems had reached a threshold that caused
Kristy Ragsdale to request and to receive a court-ordered protective order against
Defendants' patient. (Add.4 at ^ 28) The legal relationship between the parties,
therefore, is that of a health care provider and the family of the patient being treated.
Consider how this would have played out had Mr. Ragsdale committed suicide
instead of murdering his wife, and his family members brought this claim. Claims of this
nature are routinely permitted if the suicide is shown to have been foreseeable. E.g.,
Edwards v. Tardif, 240 Conn. 610, 616, 692 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Conn. 1997) ("suicide will
not break the chain of causation if it was a foreseeable result of the defendant's tortious
act"); Patton v. Thompson, 958 So. 2d 303, 313 (Ala. 2006) ("plaintiff in a medicalmalpractice action against a psychiatrist arising out of the suicide of the psychiatrist's
patient must prove ... that the breach was a proximate cause of the patient's death");
Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 462, 545 A.2d 159, 164 (N.J. 1988) ("This duty of care
to prevent self-inflicted harm arises in this case because there was a foreseeable risk that
plaintiffs condition ... included the danger that she would injure herself).
Since claims by family members of those who commit suicide are permitted, it
would make little sense to bar claims where the patient, instead of taking his or her own
life, takes the life of a family member.
The "foreseeability of injury:" Normandeau held that "[wjhether a harm was
foreseeable in the context of determining duty depends on the general foreseeability of
such harm, not whether the specific mechanism of the harm could be foreseen." 2009 UT
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44 at ^J 20. It is not necessary, therefore, that the eventual shooting have been
foreseeable, but only the general fact that Mr. Ragsdale might seek to harm his estranged
wife. Here, the Amended Complaint specifically alleges that the violent outburst was a
foreseeable result of Defendants' negligence (Add.7 at ^ 36-37), and that fact must be
taken as true on a Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs recognize that courts exercise caution before imposing liability for the
intentional acts of others, particularly when the individuals involved are having
psychiatric problems.10 This Court, however, specifically dealt with the question of the
imposition of a duty of care when a criminal act is involved, and ruled that a duty exists if
a defendant creates an unreasonably enhanced danger of a criminal act:
Many jurisdictions have held that under "special" or "unusual"
circumstances, a duty may exists where a defendant should reasonably
anticipate that its conduct will create an unreasonably enhanced danger to
one in the position of the injured plaintiffs. If such danger is foreseeable,
then a duty arises to exercise reasonable care for the safety of other.
Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Utah 1996).

Many courts have noted the difficulty of predicting when a mentally ill patient will
commit an act of violence. E.g., Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 39
Ohio St. 3d 86, 97, 529 N.E.2d 449, 459 (Ohio 1988) ("Though a psychiatrist's ability to
predict violent behavior is probably better than a layperson's, and there does appear to be
some consensus within the mental health community on the factors relevant to a
diagnosis of violent propensities, diagnosing both the existence of violent propensities
and their severity is still a highly subjective undertaking"). These cases, however,
involve claims of omission - usually a failure to warn, or a failure to keep a person
confined - and thus the courts look for a "special relationship" before imposing a duty of
care. A different analysis is required here because Defendants are alleged to have
triggered the violence conduct, not merely failed to warn.
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Cruz involved an auto dealership that consistently left keys in its cars, despite
repeated thefts. A car was stolen, and the thief crashed and injured the plaintiffs. The
Court allowed the claim to proceed because "the theft of the car and its negligent
operation may have been foreseeable...." Id.
The Cruz holding is consistent the consensus view on this point. The Restatement
of Torts 2d, for example, provides in Section 302 B:
As act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realized or should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the
conduct of the other of a third person which is intended to cause harm, even
though such conduct is criminal.
Accord, Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141, 148, 849 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Mass. 2006) ("a third
party's criminal conduct is not unforeseeable if 'the actor at the time of his negligent
conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that... a third person might avail
himself of the opportunity to commit such a ... crime'").
The Amended Complaint makes a more compelling case for the imposition of a
duty than Cruz, because it alleges that Mr. Ragsdale's violent actions were not only
foreseeable, they were caused in part by Defendants' negligent prescription of certain
drugs. The Amended Complaint, therefore, alleges the special circumstances required
under Cruz to find the criminal conduct of another foreseeable.
The fact that the claim is based on affirmative acts plays an important role here, as
well. Courts in other jurisdictions have noted the act/omission dichotomy impacts the
question of whether someone is responsible for the acts of a third party:
"[A] person is ordinarily not liable for the actions of another and is under
no duty to protect another from harm, in the absence of a special
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relationship of custody or control." ... This well-established principle of
California tort jurisprudence, which may be appropriately referred to as the
"no duty to aid" rule, is "based on the concept that a person should not be
liable for 'nonfeasance' in failing to act as a 'good Samaritan.' It has no
application where the defendant, through his or her own action
{misfeasance) has made the plaintiffs position worse and has created a
foreseeable risk of harm from the third person. In such cases the question of
duty is governed by the standards of ordinary care.
Romero v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 4th 1068, 1079, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801, 809 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001) (emphasis in original).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts makes the same distinction, pointing out in
Comment e to Section 302 B (quoted above) the difference between acts and omissions:
There are, however, situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is
required to anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even criminal,
misconduct of others. In general, these situations arise where the actor is
under a special reasonability toward the one who suffers the harm, which
includes the duty to protect him against such intentional misconduct; or
where the actor's own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to
a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct,
which a reasonable man would take into account, (emphasis added)
By any measure, therefore, the foreseeability allegations of the Amended
Complaint make a strong case for finding a duty of care.
The "likelihood of injury:" The Amended Complaint alleges that the drugs
prescribed to David Ragsdale carry the risk of dangerous side effects, including violent
outbursts. The Amended Complaint also alleges Defendants knew David Ragsdale was
under a restraining order, and yet Defendants improperly continued to prescribe him a
cocktail of psychiatric drugs which carry a risk of the same dangerous side effects.
Plaintiffs alleged and are fully prepared to offer expert testimony that this negligence
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made a violent outburst against Kristy Ragsdale likely. Thus, the pleading fulfils the
"likelihood of injury requirement."
The "public policy as to which party can best bear the loss:" The general
principal is that those who are negligent should be accountable for the foreseeable
consequences of their conduct, particularly, as noted above, in cases involved affirmative
acts, rather than omissions:
the public policy behind tort law is to hold tortfeasors accountable for
harms occasioned by their fault. See generally Nabors Drilling, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Escoto, 288 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. 2009) ("Liability is grounded in
the public policy behind the law of negligence which dictates every person
is responsible for injuries which are the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of his act or omission."). Accordingly, as between an
innocent party and a negligent tortfeasor, public policy requires that any
loss should be born by the tortfeasor.
Normandeau v. Hanson Equipment, Inc., 2010 UT App 121, TJ 4, 233 P.3d 546.
There are several other policy considerations at work here that go beyond whether
the injury Defendants caused was foreseeable. As noted several times, the key allegation
is that Defendants prescribed drugs that were uncalled for in this situation, and further,
that those drugs made a violent outburst more likely. Choosing the right treatment goes
to the core of what health care providers must do, and it would be dangerous to find that
health care providers owe no duty to those injured by a wrong course of treatment.
There is also the allegation that Nurse West failed to consult with a physician,11
something she was required to do (Utah Code § 58-31b-502(15)) when prescribing

11

As noted at page 5 above, Defendant Dr. Rodier filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
(that was never ruled upon) based on the fact that he claimed Nurse West never spoke to
him about Mr. Ragsdale's treatment. (R3 3 0-3 60)
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certain of the drugs involved here. The consultation requirement is a function of the
more limited training nurses receive, and to fail to undertake a legal obligation of this
nature creates an increased risk of the selection of a harmful course of treatment. Again,
it would be dangerous to find that health care providers owe no duty of care to those
injured when they fail to fulfill the basic legal obligations assigned to their profession.
"k

"k "k

In sum, Plaintiffs will bear the burden of proving at trial that the drugs prescribed
by Defendants were a cause of Mr. Ragsdale's violent outburst. If that burden is met, all
policy considerations weigh in favor of finding that Defendants owed a duty of care to
anyone injured by that outburst, particularly when those injured were the patient's
immediate family members.
II.

Collateral Estoppel Does Not Apply To This Case.
Introduction
Defendants' alternative Motion for Summary Judgment argued that Mr.

Ragsdale's guilty plea foreclosed Plaintiffs from trying to prove that the drugs prescribed
by Defendants were a cause of his conduct. The District Court did not reach this issue,
but ruled that if it were to have reached this issue, it would have rejected Defendants'
argument. (Add. 13) We offer argument on this issue in the event Defendants raise it as
an alternative ground for affirmance.
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Three elements must be present to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel (also
referred to as "issue preclusion"):12
1. The party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party
or in privity with a party in the prior litigation.
2. The issue was completely, fully, and fairly litigated in the prior litigation.
3. The issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue in the current
litigation. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, t 13, 99 P.3d 842.
All three elements are absent.
A,

Plaintiffs were neither parties nor in privity
with parties in the criminal proceeding.

Plaintiffs were not parties to the criminal litigation, which was between the State
and David Ragsdale. Defendants argued below that that Plaintiffs were "in privity" with
the prosecution because of the input they were entitled to provide under the Rights of
Crime Victims Act, Utah Code Ann. §77-38-1, et. seq. This argument ignores well
established law on what constitutes "privity" for the purposes of collateral estoppel.
In Brigham Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 205 UT 19, f 29, 110
P.3d 678, this Court set out the test for privity as applied to collateral estoppel:
We have stated that "a person in privity with another ... is a person so
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right."
As examples, the Court noted the following: a mutually successive relationship to rights
in property, a legal representative of another, a guardian and a ward, and a trustee and the
12

There is a fourth element, the requirement of a final judgment in the prior proceeding,
but it is not disputed that the criminal proceeding resulted in a final judgment.
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beneficiaries of the trust. See also, Press Publishing, Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Int., Ltd,
2001 UT 106,1f 20, 37 P.3d 1121 (several purportedly separate corporate entities that are
all affiliates or subsidiaries of the same corporate parent are in privity).
There is no such relationship here between Plaintiffs, the victims of a crime, and
the State of Utah. Under the Utah Rights of Crime Victims Act, Plaintiffs were entitled
to be present and to be heard in the criminal proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-4.
They had no control over the proceedings, and the prosecutor could have ignored their
input. This limited right to be present and to be heard does not identify Plaintiffs with the
interests of the prosecution in such a way that one can say that they represent the "same
legal right." See, e.g., Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1978) (privity
means you had the "right to cross-examine witnesses, control the proceedings or appeal
from the judgment...."). There is no basis, therefore, for finding that the victims of a
crime are in privity with the prosecution. To hold otherwise would lead to the cruel irony
that the decision by a murderer to plead guilty limited the rights of his victims.
B.

The "issue" was not litigated in the prior proceeding.

The "issue" Defendants claim Plaintiffs are barred from litigating is whether the
drugs were a cause of Mr. Ragsdale's conduct. By pleading guilty, Mr. Ragsdale
implicitly waived a defense based on involuntary intoxication, which might have
involved the question of what role the drugs played in his conduct. Waiving a defense is
not litigating an issue. The doctrine of issue preclusion is designed to prevent parties
from litigating an issue twice and having two decisions on the same issue. Because he
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pled guilty, there was never any litigation of, nor a decision on, the issue Defendants seek
to apply collateral estoppel to.
C.

The "issue" is not identical.

For collateral estoppel to apply the issue in the two cases must be "identical," not
merely similar, and the issues in the criminal case and this civil lawsuit are materially
different. Defendants argue that Mr. Ragsdale could have taken the position in the
criminal case that he did not intentionally or knowingly kill his wife because of the drugs
he was taking. Thus, by pleading guilty, Defendants argue, Mr. Ragsdale admitted the
drugs were not a cause of his conduct.
This does not show, however, that the issues in the two cases are "identical." The
involuntary intoxication defense could only have been raised if it would have shown that
Mr. Ragsdale lacked the mental state necessary to commit murder
It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the
defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as
an element of the offense charged.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(l)(a).
In a civil tort case, the issue is whether the drugs taken by Mr. Ragsdale were a
proximate cause of his conduct. There can even be multiple proximate causes.
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), affd, 862
P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993) ("there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury so long
as each is a concurrent contributing factor in causing the injury"). This is a different
issue than the question of whether Mr. Ragsdale "lacked the mental state required" to
commit a crime. Put most simply, the issue of intent in the criminal case, and proximate
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causation in a civil tort action, are not identical. For this additional reason, therefore,
collateral estoppel does not apply.
CONCLUSION
For the reason stated in this Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully request that
this Court reverse the District Court's Order granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
and remanding this case for further proceedings.
Dated this

day of June, 2011.
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ADDENDUM

Tyler S.Young (11325)
Allen K. Young (3583)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
75 South 300 West
Provo,UT 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-0700
Facsimile: (801) 379-0701

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

B. R., a minor child, and C. R., a minor
child, through their conservator
WILLIAM M. JEFFS,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED COMPLAINT

Civil No. 100907025
Judge : Denise Lindberg

v.
TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P, HUGO
RODIER, M.D., and PIONEER
COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CLINIC
and JOHN DOES I - X,

JURY TRIAL REQUESTED

Defendants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, Tyler S. Young and Allen
K. Young of Young, Kester & Petro, and for cause of action against the defendants
alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.
Utah.

At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs were residents of Utah County,

2.

At all times relevant hereto, Trina West, Advanced Family Nurse

Practitioner (hereinafter "A.F.N.P."), was licensed by the State of Utah to practice
nursing at her principle place of business in Draper, Salt Lake County, Utah.
3.

At all times relevant hereto, Hugo Rodier, M.D., was licensed by the State

of Utah to practice medicine at his principle place of business in Draper, Salt Lake
County, Utah.
4.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Pioneer Comprehensive Medical

Clinic retained, hired, supervised and controlled its staff and employees, and supervised
as well as controlled, through granting of medical privileges, its medical staff at its place
of business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
5.

At all times relevant hereto, John Does I through X were persons or

entities residing in or doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
6.

The tortious acts complained of occurred in Salt Lake County, Utah.

7.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter in accordance with the

provisions of Utah Code Annotated Utah Code Annotated 78A-5-102 (2008 as
Amended).
8.

Venue is properly laid with this Court in accordance with the provisions of

Utah Code Annotated Section 78B-3-307 (2008 as Amended).
9.

Plaintiff has met the requirements of Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,

Section 78B-3-412.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
10.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 9 and further allege as follows:
11.

Utah law allows an Advanced Family Nurse Practitioner, like Trina West,

to prescribe "Schedule II and III" controlled substances only in "consultation with" a
licensed medical doctor.
12.

On or about April 16, 2007 David Ragsdale began a regular course of

treatment at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic with Trina West, A.F.N.P.
13.

On or about April 16, 2007 Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David

Ragsdale two powerful steroids (Testosterone and Pregnenolone).
14.

The steroids Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David Ragsdale both carry

the risk of causing psychiatric complications such as steroid-induced mania.
15.

Mr. Ragsdale was prescribed those steroids with little to no medical

inclination.
16.

Testosterone is a "Schedule III" controlled substance.

17.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed Mr. Ragsdale testosterone without

consulting Dr. Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor.
18.

On or about May 2, 2007 Trina West, A.F.N.P., increased Mr. Ragsdale's

doses of Testosterone and Pregnenolone.

19.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., increased Mr. Ragsdale's doses of the steroids

without consulting Hugo Rodier M.D., or any other medical doctor.
20.

On or about July 9, 2007 Mr. Ragsdale had a follow up visit at the clinic.

21.

During that visit, Mr. Ragsdale was prescribed Concerta a "Schedule II"

controlled substance by Trina West, A.F.N.P.
22.

Concerta is the brand name for the psychostimulant drug methylphenidate.

23.

Methylphenidate carries many of the same risks associated with

methamphetamine.
24.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., prescribed David Ragsdale Concerta without

consulting Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor.
25.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., diagnosed David Ragsdale with Attention Deficit

Disorder (AD/HD), to justify the prescription for Concerta.
26.

On or about September 5, 2007, Trina West, A.F.N.P., doubled David

Ragsdale's doses of Concerta from 36 mg to 72 mg per day.
27.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., doubled David Ragsdale's dose of Concerta without

consulting Hugo Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor.
28.

On or before December 21, 2007, David Ragsdale represented to Trina

West, A.F.N.P. that he was having marital problems and that a restraining order had been
entered against him by his wife, Kxisty Ragsdale.
29.

On or before December 21, 2007, David Ragsdale was displaying toxic

30.

After a visit on or about December 21, 2007, and after several other visits

at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, David Ragsdale was being prescribed the
following combination of psychotropic medications by Trina West, A.F.N.P.:
•

The psychostimulant Concerta at 54 mg daily

•

The tranquilizer Valium at 5 mg daily

•

The antidepressant Doxepin at 100 mg daily

•

The antidepressant Paxil at 40 mg daily

•

The steroid Pregnenolone at 600 mg daily

•

The hair-loss medication Propecia at 1 mg daily

•

The steroid Testosterone at 200 mg weekly by intramuscular inj ection
31.

On January 6, 2008, David Ragsdale shot his wife, Kristy Ragsdale (the

mother of plaintiffs B.R. and C.R.), thirteen times in a church parking lot, in broad
daylight, in front of several witnesses.
32.

Within two hours of the shooting, David Ragsdale turned himself in to the

33.

Blood toxicology reports taken from David Ragsdale show that he was

police.

within the prescribed ranges of all of his medications and that he had no illicit substances
in his blood stream at the time of shooting.

COUNT 1
NEGLIGENCE OF TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P.
34.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 33 and further allege as follows:
35.

Trina West, A.F.N.P., was negligent in the following, but not limited to

the following particulars:
a.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to consult with Hugo Rodier, M.D.,

or any other medical doctor prior to prescribing David Ragsdale Testosterone and/or
Concerta.
b.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to consult with Hugo Rodier, M.D.,

or any other medical doctor prior to increasing David Ragsdale's doses of Testosterone
and/or Concerta.
c.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to have a consultation plan with Hugo

Rodier, M.D., or any other medical doctor prior to prescribing David Ragsdale
Testosterone and/or Concerta.
d.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to have adequate justification for

prescribing David Ragsdale the combination of medications he was being prescribed in
the months leading up to the shooting of Kristy Ragsdale.
e.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to discontinue David Ragsdale's

prescription regimen.

f.

The failure of Trina West, A.F.N.P., to properly monitor, refer, and treat

David Ragsdale.
36.

The negligence of Trina West A.F.N.P. was likely to cause the conduct

toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and death.
37.

The failures of Trina West A.F.N.P., were a direct, proximate, and

foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, of Kristy
Ragsdale.
38.

As a result of the negligence of Trina West, A.F.N.P., Plaintiffs have lost

the care comfort, society, and support of their parents.
39.

The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional

distress as a result of the negligence of Trina West, A.F.N.P.
COUNT 2
NEGLIGENCE OF HUGO RODIER, M.D.
40.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 39 and further allege as follows:
41.

On information and belief, Hugo Rodier, M.D., was Trina West's

supervising and/or "consulting" physician at Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic.
42.

Utah Law required Tina West, A.F.N.P., to have a "consultation plan"

with a medical doctor which would allow her to then consult with a medical doctor to
prescribe schedule II and III controlled substances to David Ragsdale.

43.

On information and belief, although Dr. Hugo Rodier, M.D., knew or

should have known Trina West, A.F.N.P. was treating David Ragsdale, and prescribing
David Ragsdale medications, no consultation plan existed between Hugo Rodier, M.D.,
and Trina West, A.F.N.P.
44.

The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to follow the appropriate standard of

care also includes, but is not limited to:
2L

The failure of Hugo Rodier, M.D., to consult with Trina West, A.F.N.P.,

about David Ragsdale's treatment and prescriptions.
b.

The failure of Hugo Rodier, MX)., to properly monitor, refer, and treat

David Ragsdale.
45.

The negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D. was likely to cause the conduct

toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and death.
46.

The failures of Hugo Rodier, M.D., were a direct, proximate, and

foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death, of Kristy
Ragsdale.
47.

As a result of the negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D., Plaintiffs have lost

the care comfort, society, and support of their parents.
48.

The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional

distress as a result of the negligence of Hugo Rodier, M.D.

COUNT3
NEGLIGENCE OF PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL CLINIC
AND JOHN DOES I - X
49.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 48 and further allege as follows:
50.

The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, and John Does I -

X, by and through their agents, staff, nurses and employees, to follow the appropriate
standard of care includes, but is not limited to:
a.

The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I -

X, by and through their agents, staff, employees and nurses to properly monitor, refer,
and treat David Ragsdale.
b.

The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, by and through its

agents, staff, employees and nurses to ensure that Trina West, A.F.N.P., was not
exceeding her ability and authority to prescribe David Ragsdale medications.
c.

The failure of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, by and through its

agents, staff, employees and nurses to ensure that Trina West, A.F.N.P., and Hugo
Rodier, M.D., had a proper consultation plan.
51.

The negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I

- X was likely to cause the conduct toward Kristy Ragsdale that led to her shooting and
death.

52.

The failures of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic were a direct,

proximate, and foreseeable cause of the conduct that led to the shooting, as well as death,
ofKristyRagsdale.
53.

As a result of the negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic,

Plaintiffs have lost the care, comfort, society, and support of their parents.
54.

The Plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe emotional

distress as a result of the negligence of Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic.
COUNT 4
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
55.

Plaintiffs hereby reference and incorporate as if set forth herein the

allegations of paragraphs 1 through 54 and further allege as follows:
56.

Plaintiffs claim that the acts or omissions of the defendant Trina West,

A.F.N.P., Hugo Rodier, M.D., Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic and John Does I X, were a result of willful and malicious conduct, or conduct that manifested a knowing
and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:
1. For general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial;
2. For interest on special damages from January 6, 2008, to the date of judgment
herein;
3. For punitive damages in an amount to be proved at trial;

5. For costs of suit incurred herein; and
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the
premises.
DATED this z<?&\ day of April, 2010.
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury.
DATED this &fr\

day of April, 2010.
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO

Third Judicial District

htb 0 1 2011
STEPHEN W. OWENS - #6957
J. KEVIN MURPHY - #5768 (of counsel)
EPPERSON & OWENS, P.C.
10 West 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 983-9800
Telefax:
(801) 983-9808
sovvens(g)eola'woffice.com
kmurph y (gteolawoffice, com
Attorneys for Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P

OALI LMKC O U U I N I l

—

Deputy ClerK

EPPERSON & OWENS
FEB 2 . 2011

RECEIVED

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

B.R., a minor child, and C.R., a minor child, ])
through their Conservator WILLIAM M.
])
JEFFS,
;)
Plaintiffs,
]
v.
TRINA WEST, A.F.N.P., HUGO RODIER,
M.D., and PIONEER COMPREHENSIVE
MEDICAL CLINIC,
Defendants.

]
)
;
]}
)
]

RULING AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS

Civil No. 100907025
Judge Denise Lindberg

Defendant Trina West, A.F.N.P., joined by co-defendants Hugo Rodier, M.D., and
Pioneer Comprehensive Medical Clinic, has moved to dismiss plaintiffs5 complaint under Utah
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). These defendants have also moved, alternatively or additionally, for
summary judgment against plaintiffs under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b). On December 20, 2010, oral
argument was heard on these motions, with counsel for all parties present.
Having reviewed the parties' memoranda and heard oral argument, this Court now rules
as follows: The Court is persuaded that the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted.

17

This is based upon the fact that no patient-health care provider relationship existed, at the time of
the underlying events, between the plaintiffs - who are the children of David and Rristy
Ragsdale - and the defendants. The patient was David Ragsdale, who is not a party to this
lawsuit. The Court is not persuaded that, under the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint, the
non-patient plaintiffs may step into David Ragsdale's shoes to pursue a malpractice lawsuit
against the defendants.
In light of its ruling on the motion to dismiss, it is not necessary to decide the defendants'
alternative motion for summary judgment. However, if this Court were to reach that alternative
motion, it would deny it. Denial would be based upon the defendants' failure to satisfy all
requirements for issue preclusion, which they assert as the basis for their alternative motion.
Specifically, issue preclusion is not satisfied because the plaintiffs in this civil case were not
parties to the previous, criminal case against David Ragsdale; nor were they in privity with any
party to that case.
For the foregoing reasons, and for the additional reasons stated from the bench on
December 20, 2010, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to
dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

SO ORDERED this_§\_ day of

,]dV\\KPi^

, 2011.

BY THE COURT

DENISE LINDBERG
District Court Judge
Approved as to form
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2
MONDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2010
1.36 P.M.
3
* **
4
PROCEEDINGS
!5
* **
i 6
THE COURT We're on the record on Case
7
No 100907025 It's the matter of Ragsdale versus Tnna
8
West, et a!
9
If 1 can have counsel state your appearances
10
MR YOUNG Tyler Young for the plaintiff, judge,
11
with Jonah Orlofsky and Allen Young
12
MR OWENS Stephen Owens and Kevin Murphy on 13
behalf of defendant Tnna West
14
THE COURT Thank you This is defendant's motion 15
16
to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment You
17
may take the podium, and thank you for the courtesy copies
that were submitted earlier
18
19
MR OWENS Well, there was a terrible -THE COURT 1 should note that 1 have reviewed the 20
21
record
22
MR OWENS There was a terrible murder in
23
January 2008, and the murderer is at the state prison serving
24
20 to life As I articulate our position here, Your Honor,
25
we think this is a position - an effort to hold a health
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

case My client's patient is sitting in a locked cell at
Point of the Mountain He's not suing her for medical
malpractice He's not saying she violated care standards,
and yet his children, through a conservator, are
Vour Honor, we think this idea, this holding
someone liable, a care provider, to a third person turns on
custody and control And under this Young case, Footnote 7
on the right the first indented paragraph, it says, "Control
over or custody of the primary person who caused the injury
is a necessary prerequisite before engaging in a
foreseeability-of-harm analysis" Do you see that? It's the
paragraph that's under second
So a lot of the briefing went into, okay, they pled
foreseeability, that's enough, and we're saying, no, you have
to establish a duty, and to have duty you have to have
custody and control So what are the cases where they've at
least evaluated this? State prisoners, civil commitment of
mental patients, and there's a truck mechanic case where a
truck went out of control, and they sued the brake repair
person that they had custody and control over those brakes
that they were repairing
The two most recent cases that I've seen where they
said no custody and control and therefore we're not even
going down the road of foreseeability was a school district,
which is the Young case, saying essentially a kid got hit by
4
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care provider liable for her patient's criminal conduct, A,
when the provider has no control or custody over the patient,
and when the patient has taken full responsibility for his
actions
So let me talk about the first one first Andl
apologize that we did this in a supplemental brief as we
prepared for what we thought was the prior hearing a month or
two ago
Your Honor, 1 think this Young case is the most
significant case
THE COURT If you'd wait just a second to make
sure 1 have the full file in front of me
MR OWENS Sure
(Pause in proceedings)
MR OWENS So I'll focus in a minute on Tab 13 and
then Subtab 2 -- or excuse, Subtab 1, Young versus Salt Lake
School District, and then go to page 6, and then on the right
of page 6 let me first just do an overview
If 1 go to the doctor, or in this case a nurse
practitioner, and, again, I'm here on behalf of Tnna West,
nurse practitioner, and that provider gives me a
prescription, the question is -- or provides any treatment,
maybe they operate on me, maybe they do what ever The point
is the provider does not owe a duty to my children
Mr Ragsdale is alive This isn't a wrongful death
MhDV pirrnu- rnn>ir
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a car, and they're saying you should have had a crossing
guard and things like that on the way to school or to a
parent-teacher conference, and they said the school didn't
have custody and control over that kid so it couldn't be sued
font
And then there's a more recent case actually, LDS
church case where a member abused someone, and they sued Ihe
church This is Doe V The Corporation of the President of
the Church of jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 98 P 3d 429
And the Court held that there was no duty on behalf of the
church because they didn't have custody and control over the
abuser
That makes sense because from a policy standpoint
let's say I'm a nurse practitioner, and a troubled guy comes
into my office, which they do every day Now let's say,
gosh, he has marital problems, he's got some mental health
problems, I'm not going to touch this guy because if he does
something wrong, if he does some criminal conduct, I'm going
to be on the hook for that And 1 guarantee that's what my
client thinks now when a troubled guy who has marital
problems comes into her office, which they do weekly, and,
she says, well, should 1 give him an antidepressant She's
gun shy, and that's the public policy that's being promoted
here is you're not just responsible for this patient but for
whoever this patient deals with, which doesn't make sense
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The second issue, Your Honor, which goes to our
summary judgment motion, goes to this idea that somehow my
client is on the hook for -- should be on the hook for when
my client's patient has taken full responsibility to the tune
of 20 to life m a cage for his wrongful act, for intentional
or knowing misconduct It's interesting, Judge Laycock and this is Tab 2, Exhibit 2 She's taking his plea, and on
page 12 says "All right And do you understand that by
pleading guilty today you're admitting that you committed the
crime as described in these elements and those elements on
page 11 that you intentionally or knowingly caused the death
of another, Knsty Ragsdale, and that you knowingly created a
great risk of death to a person other than the victim and
you7" And he said, "Yes, Your Honor"
Then at another - as part of that, and this was a
full hour hearing which I'm sure Your Honor has done many
times, but the prosecutor stated, and this is on page 25,
"judge" -- the prosecutor lays out the factual allegation
"Judge, on January 6,2008, the defendant intentionally shot
and killed Knsty Ragsdale, the defendant's wife The murder
occurred in an LDS parking lot in Lehi as Knsty walked from
her car to the chapel doors When Mr Ragsdale initially
shot Knsty, standing behind her several yards were Aaron
Wiggmtons and his two sons A round actually struck the
front grille of the car the Wiggmtons were standing beside
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informed, I don't want more time, this is what I want to do,
went through a long colloquy with the Court on those issues,
and now they're having the children's conservator saying, no,
that's not right, that he really was involuntarily
intoxicated
Mr Ragsdale's nowhere to be seen in the suit
Again, that's who my client owed a duty to It's
interesting -- and I won't get into these because for issues
of this hearing their allegations are assumed to be true,
but, suffice it to say, weeks before the murder there's not a
raging lunatic in her office She's telling him I feel the
best I've felt in ten years, but these are issues that are
not best addressed right now
But here is my point Her patient is not unhappy
with her cm evidently He's not in the suit, he's not
suing her, and it would be laughable if he were because he
stood before a court and pleaded to aggravated murder
Your Honor, based on those issues, it would be --1
think on the policy issues it just doesn't make sense to put
that kind of infinite burden on a health care provider trying
to help her patient And we already have someone who was
fully advised, attorneys and experts, saying I'm guilty
without raising an involuntary intoxication defense And
I'll submit it unless you have questions
THE COURT Well, I just my only question ~
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obviously the summary judgment motion is as a backup to your
motion to dismiss on the basis of duty
MR OWENS Right We want you to grant both, just
in case you were wondering
THE COURT Well, let's just leave it there for
now Let's see what opposing counsel has to say
MR ORLOFSKY My name is Jonah Orlofsky I'll be
speaking for the plaintiffs
I think I'd like to start by emphasizing two facts
that will play a role in the legal arguments I make that I
think distinguish this case from any of the other cases that
come before it and make this case a fairly extraordinary set
of circumstances from a legal point of view, aside from the
dramatic facts
These are the two facts I want to emphasize First
of all, this is not a case, like most of the cases that have
come before it, where the alleged wrongdoing by a health care
provider was a failure to warn or a failure to keep somebody
in custody, to keep somebody in a mental institution
In all of those cases, the malpractice that was
being alleged was not with respect to how the patient was
being treated, the patient was being treated appropriately
But during the course of the health care provider's
treatment, the health care provider allegedly came across
information that violent conduct was supposedly possible, and
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and thereby knowingly created great risk of death to another
"The Court All right And those are the facts as
I remember them from the preliminary hearing Do you admit
that that is what happened7
"The Defendant Yes, Your Honor"
The idea of issue preclusion is an equitable
creation to help the Court, first of all, save judicial
resources, also to prevent basically litigated matters from
being relitigated and possibly having contrary findings
It's not a perfect label here because we don't have obviously
the same party suing the same party, but the prosecutor
worked closely with the victim's family, and the victim's
family signed off on this And as we know with recent
statutes providing certain rights to victims, they were
involved in that at least and felt good about it
So, Your Honor, we're now essentially with these
children's attorney asserting on their behalf that it is not
their dad who murdered their mom, it was their dad's
medications that made their dad murder their mom, which is
contrary to the fully litigated effort with Mr Ragsdale
It's not a small thing to stand before the Court under oath
and say I admit, you know, I'm guilty And this is with the
benefit of several lawyers, with the benefit of several
experts that the defense had retained, he said to the judge I
feel really good about the advice I've received, I feel fully

:l
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so the claim was that although the health care provider was
1
providing proper treatment, they also had a duty to either
2
warn people who might be the victims of some violence, go to
3
the authorities, or perhaps restrain the person In this
4
case that's not what's happening here We have alleged that
5
the malpractice was in connection with the very treatment of
6
the patient
7
THE COURT So why isn't the patient, Mr Ragsdale, 8
a plaintiff? What s your authority to act on behalf of
9
Mr Ragsdale7 You have none
10
MR ORLOFSKY That's correct, we have none We're 11
not representing him, we've not been asked to represent him
12
We're here on behalf of the guardian of the children, and the
13
guardian of the children has said that he believes the
14
children have rights that ought to be pursued, and that's
15
what we're pursuing here
16
THE COURT But if you are asserting now that a
17
critical fact here is malpractice against Mr Ragsdale, the
18
children do not stand in their father's shoes Their
19
conservator does not stand in the shoes So I still fail to
20
see how that's relevant to the issue for decision by me
21
MR ORLOFSKY So the question then is can someboqy22
other than the patient bring a claim for malpractice7 Is
23
that my understanding that's the question that you're
24
raising7
25

that Your Honor is posing, and I'll get to that special
relationship test That's the question of can these children
bring their own malpractice claim when they were not treated
by this physician There's no dispute they were not treated
They are bringing their own claim as if they are bystanders
who were injured by what was done to this patient
THE COURT Okay
MR ORLOFSKY And the argument has been made thai
no, the malpractice law in this state simply limits the case,
only the patient can bring the malpractice claim, and I
believe that's wrong, and I believe there's strong authority
why that's wrong
THE COURT Okay Talk to me about that
MR ORLOFSKY First of all, let's start out with
the authority that supports that argument, and that's the two
cases that are cited
THF COURT Phillips
MR ORLOFSKY Joseph and Wilcox That's Wilcox
versusSaltLakeCity and Joseph versus McCann Those cases,
I think, address a very different question In both of those
cases, someone hired a physician to review the medical
situation of employees, or in one case it was for people who
wanted to get a license from the state The physicians were
not retained by the person who was being seen by the
physician The physician was retained
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THE COURT Well.no
1
MR ORLOFSKY Can somebody who is injured by a
2
malpractice but is not the patient, a third party who was
3
injured or claims to be injured by the malpractice, can that
4
5
person make a claim against the doctor7
6
THE COURT Well, I think that in some
7
circumstances there's been law -- well, you make your
8
argument because I don't want to frame it for you I want
9
you to frame it in whichever way you think you want me to
10
consider it
11
MR ORLOFSKY But I'm trying to understand the
12
question
13
THE COURT Well, I'm failing to see the point of
14
why you start out by saying I think this is a critical fact,
15
and that's all I was just commenting that I don't see it as
16
a critical fact because of the posture of the case That's
17
all
MR ORLOFSKY I guess the reason I was emphasizing 18
19
that fact is it doesn't go to the issue of whether a
20
nonpatent can sue a doctor It goes to the different issue
21
of the special relationship test that the defendants have
22
been arguing vigorously should apply here, so it went to a
7
23
different issue Does that make any sense
24
THE COURT Go ahead
MR ORLOFSKY So let me maybe turn to the issue 25
MARY BETH COOK, C&;

I don't think they answer the question in this case
because in that case there was no physician/patient
relationship The people who were being seen by the
physician, the physician was hired as a consultant
THE COURT But isn't the critical issue in Joseph,
isn't the crux of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Joseph that whether a plaintiff bringing a malpractice action
has to show that there's a provider-patient relationship, and
the court said -- to establish a duty of care, and the court
said, yeah, you do So granted that the fact situation -the fact context was different, but the legal point of the
Supreme Court -- of the Court of Appeals' decision in Joseph
is directly on point
MR ORLOFSKY And here's where I suggest that it's
not, and I'll show authorities that I think strongly apply
that it's not, but let me first address the point there
What I think that court was saying is you cannot
have a malpractice claim without a physician-patient
relationship That does not answer the question of when
there is a physician-patient relationship and there has been
malpractice towards the patient are there third parties who
can bring a claim because they, too, were injured by that
malpractice What that case was holding is there was no
physician-patient relationship A physician was not seeing a
patient for the purposes of providing medical care, and
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without a physician-patient relationship, quite logically how
can you have a malpractice claim The physician was not
treating a patient They were reviewing xrays for someone
who had hired them on a contractual basis as a consultant
So there's one question, can you ever have a
malpractice claim if there's no physician-patient
relationship Those cases clearly say no, and I think you'll
find all around the country courts say the same thing It's
a different question when there is a physician-patient
relationship can a third party bring a claim saying I was
injured by that malpractice, too That's a different
question that was not answered by those cases
Now let me give you some evidence of why I think
the case law says that it was not answered Let's take the
Higgins case Higgins versus Salt Lake County is one of the
cases the defendants rely a lot on It's one of those mental
health patient cases That's a case where the court held
that before you can bring a claim for being injured by a
mental health patient, you need to show a special
relationship The plaintiff in that case was not the person
who was being treated by the mental health authorities It
was third parties
In that case there was a girl who had been stabbed
The defendants in Higgins were a doctor and a nurse, very
much like this case A nurse was the primary care Now
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clearly the only way you can explain all those results by the
Utah Supreme Court So that's one bit of evidence I think is
very clear that it implies what I'm saying is the correct
interpretation of those two appellate court decisions
The other bit of authority we bring is the
malpractice statute As we've pointed out, the statute of
limitations in medical malpractice cases, that's Code
78B-3-404, talks about the time for plaintiffs or patients to
bring claims And, again, the implication of the argument
made by the defendants is that no one other than a patient
can ever make a claim for malpractice, and yet that statute
clearly implies that you're going to have other people other
than the patients bringing the claims
THE COURT But that language -- the quoted
language permits a nonpatent to bring a suit under a
malpractice act, but I don't think anything in that section
suggests that the doctor owes a duty to nonpatents in the
malpractice context There's nothing in tnat statute that
says that That particular quote is not being -- it's not
attempting to define plaintiff in that section, but, anyway,
that particular quote does not address the duty issue
MR ORLOFSKY Well, there are two separate
questions What the defendants have made is two arguments
They first said in effect you don't even look to see if
there's a duty A doctor can never owe a duty to anyone

14

1 they're suing a nurse saying that your mental health patient
2 stabbed me Does the Supreme Court say, no, case over,
3 you're not the patient, you can't bring a claim? What
4 authority do you have to bring a claim? Exactly situated as
5 we were
6
And the court went on to do its more complex
7 analysis about whether there's a special relationship
8 Clearly the underlying assumption is that a nonpatent can
9 sue a health care provider if the appropriate tort claims are
10 met, if the appropriate requirements In that case it needed
11 special relationship, and I'll get into that in a moment
12 whether we need that here, but Higgins is a Utah Supreme
13 Court case, and the defendants were a doctor and a nurse
14
And, indeed, all of those cases that the defendants
15 rely upon in those mental health cases they rely on Fand
16 (phonetic) versus State of Utah, Rollins versus Petersen,
17 Wilson versus Valley Mental Health All of those cases were
18 tort claims brought by the victims of mental health patients
19 And yet the court never once did what apparently the
20 defendants would suggest, easy case, throw it out, they
21 weren't the victims of the malpractice, but the court did
22 not
23
Now, the court didn't say we don't require a
24 doctor-patient relationship because that was limited to cases
25 where people employ doctors for different reasons, but it's
MAKY nrTTi mnv
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other than the patient he or she is treating That's their
first position, and that's been suggested by some of the
questions, can you ever owe a duty to someone other than the
patient you're treating And if a plaintiff, other than a
patient, can bring a malpractice action, that means a duty
can be owed to other people
There's a separate question about whether we meet
that here, but I think what that statute does is it says the
absolute position that only patients are owed duties,
therefore, only patients can bring claims against physicians
can't be correct
THE COURT Okay
MR ORLOFSKY Let me cite one other thing that I
think gets even more to the heart of it That is a
statute - 1 guess you could call it the duty to warn
statute The defendants have cited this It's 78B-3-502
It's entitled limitation of the therapist's duty to warn
THE COURT Right
MR ORLOFSKY That statute doesn't directly apply
here
THE COURT Let me find it
MR ORLOFSKY I can't cite you in the materials
where it is
THE COURT I don't have it right here lt's78B?
MR ORLOFSKY 78B-3-502 It's 501 and 502 I'll
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be speaking about both sections
THE COURT Okay
MR ORLOFSKY Now, this statute doesn't directly
apply here because, as I said, we're not dealing with a
failure to warn case We're dealing with malpractice in the
actual treatment of the patient that caused the patient to
become violent But here's why this statute is important
This was a statute where the legislature was trying
to help out people providing care to mental health patients
in order to curtail somewhat their liability What does this
statute mean? When did this statute ever apply? When would
you ever have a tort claim based on a failure to warn
somebody that a mental health patient might be violent7
The only situation that's going to arise in is
where there's been somebody who's been injured by a mental
health patient I can't think of any other situation in
which this statute applies Maybe there's some other, but
that's clearly the predominant reason the legislature passed
this, because they knew that you can bring in Utah a claim if
you're the victim of injuries from a mental health patient
against the health care providers, and they wanted to curtail
that, and they wanted to make it a little more clear when the
failure to give notice would give rise to a cause of action
But if the people who are injured by mental health patients
can't ever show that there was a duty owed to them, can't
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define therapist, a psychiatrist, but the statute does not
include within its protections physicians who are not trained
as psychiatrists Then down in Subsection 5 they include
within the protection a psychiatric and mental health nurse
specialist licensed to practice advanced psychiatric nursing
The nurse in this case did not have that qualification
So in other words, when the Utah legislature went
to put some limits on one type of cause of action that could
be brought against health care providers when a mental health
patient commits a physical injury, these were not the people
who were entitled to that protection
So the Utah legislature had one of two things in
mind Either they never anticipated that people with these
kind of credentials would be treating someone in this kind of
situation, or they felt that if they were they were not
entitled to any particular additional protection from the
State I think that's a powerful policy statement as to what
the Utah legislature considers when defendants such as these
are treating people in this kind of situation
This was a very complicated psychiatric situation
Six different drugs were prescribed Our evidence will show
that these people never should have been involved in treating
a case of this kind, rather a specialist should have been
But retreating back to the point here, this statute
shows that the legislature clearly knew that patients - that
20
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ever bring a claim for malpractice against the health care
providers, you don't need this statute
This statute is very closely related to the Higgins
case where you had the victim of a mental health patient's
actions bringing an action against the doctor and a nurse
Now, there was a question as to what you have to show to show
that there's a duty owed because the courts have said not
anybody can bring that cause of action But, again, the
first step is a duty can clearly be owed to people who are
the victims of violence by mental health patients
Now, I think that raises -- and I want to point out
one other thing while here on the statute It's a little off
track, but we're on the statute and I think it's important
because there's been a lot of talk about the policy
considerations here about chilling nurses and doctors from
providing mental health care because they fear the
liabilities they may be imposed with
In the statute where the Utah legislature was
attempting to curtail one type of claim against health care
providers to mental health patients, that being a failure to
warn, they were very clear in who was to get this protection
Not the defendants in this case Why? With respect -- there
were two defendants, one was a nurse, one was a doctor The
statute provides a protection to psychiatrist's license
That's definition Section 501(1) because that's how they
n/rflDV
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victims of patients would be suing Now the question is what
do we have to show to show a duty Can anybody who's injured
by a mental health patient show a duty? What is the legal
standard that we have to meet in our pleading in order to
make that cause of action, and there are a couple of
different lines of authority out there
I think there are two lines of authority that are
potentially applicable, and I'll argue why I think one The
first case that we've cited is Cruz versus Middlekauff
That's a Utah Supreme Court case That's not a case
involving a mental health situation That's the case, Your
Honor, involving a car dealership that left cars with keys in
the ignition, and they left the cars running there The car
was stolen The thief went on a high-speed chase with the
police and crashed into someone and injured them The people
who were injured by the thief sued the car dealership, and
they said you owed us a duty And not surprisingly the car
dealership said, wait a minute, there was a criminal act
here That's an intervening event that breaks the chain of
causation We can't be liable for a criminal act
And the Supreme Court looked at that carefully and
said and I'll quote Many jurisdictions have held that
under special or unusual circumstances a duty may exist where
a defendant should reasonably anticipate that its conduct
will create an unreasonably enhanced danger to one in the
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position of the injured plaintiff If such danger is
foreseeable, then a duty arises to exercise reasonable care
for the safety of others
What they went on to say in that case is it needed
to be foreseeable that your conduct would lead to criminal
conduct that could injure people That's Cruz versus
Middlekauff Now. we believe that that is the standard that
we have to meet in order to show that there's a duty owed to
a third party Is there some different standard applicable
to health care providers7 I don't believe there's ever been
a case showing a different standard applicable to health care
providers
Now. whether the cases the defendants cite for some
sort of different standards, those are those series of cases
involving mental health patients, the four cases There's
the Higgins case, the Wilson case and those four cases, the
Fand case and the Rollins case All of those cases talked
about whether or not to show a duty when there was a criminal
act When a mental health patient committed a violent act.
you had to show what they call a special relationship I
don't see how the defendants escape the Webb case from the
Supreme Court, which we discussed in our brief, which held
that a special requirement was only required in two
situations One. a government worker, government workers get
special protection, and, two, a tort case that was based on
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of the wrong drugs, drugs that are alleged to have been a
substantial cause of the violent outburst of this person I
see no authority where someone like that has to meet some
higher test other than what's in Cruz versus Middlekauff
The test is was it foreseeable It's got to be foreseeable
It can't just be that you commit a negligent act and a
criminal act occurs You have to be able to foresee that
THE COURT We have-- counsel just barely
addressed that issue on the case he referred me to. turning
back to it So what is your response then to Young7
MR ORLOFSKY Government actor, school district.
fits right within the Webb case It's three years before
Webb, by the way I believe that's 2002
THE COURT Yeah
MR ORLOFSKY It's three years before, but it fits
right in the Webb scenario That's a government act And
what the courts have said is that government people are
always acting in the public's interest, and we can't ha\/e
them hold a duty to the public at large So what they do in
the special relationship test is they narrow the duty of
government workers to where you know they're a specific
identifiable group of people who are in danger And they
also narrow it to the situation in the mental health
institutions where if someone has you in custody, it's a
little unclear exactly they're saying as to whether you need
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omission rather than the affirmative act of the defendant
It's the Webb versus University of Utah case, and it's a 2005
case, and it's really the definitive discussion of this term
"special relationship" And what it says is. "The Court of
Appeals correctly observed that as a general proposition of
tort law the distinction between acts and omissions essential
to assessing whether a duty is owed a plaintiff In almost
every instance an act carries with it a potential duty and
resulting legal accountability for that act By contrast, an
omission or failure can generally give rise to liability only
in the presence of some external circumstance, a special
relationship"
Then they also talk about how special relationship
is also needed if it's a government worker, the reason being
we don't want government workers liable to the general
public If you look at those four cases involving people who
were the victims of mental health patients suing, they all
involved cases against government workers, or it was a case
of omission where somebody failed to do something None of
those cases involve a case against a private plaintiff, a
private plaintiff who committed an affirmative act of
malpractice as we've alleged here
That gets way back to the beginning where I was
saying it's important that in this case we're not dealing
with a failure to warn We are dealing with the prescription
MARY FIFTH COOK,
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to be in custody, but in any case that Young case was a
government case, and the Webb case is very clear on that
It points out that the special relationship term
has generated some confusion because it's used in several
different ways, but it really says there's three different
scenarios that you can have is what Webb says One, private
actor, not government actor who commits an affirmative act of
misconduct, no special relationship needed If the harm is
foreseeable, that creates a duty Second scenario, private
individual who omits to do something, a failure to act You
need a special relationship Government worker, whether it's
omission, commission, any kind of claim against a government
worker, you need a special relationship You need something
more, something enhanced And what Young is saying is in
those footnotes if you've got someone in custody, that's one
of the ways you can create a special relationship, and that
kind of makes sense At that point you're now in a different
position than somebody who doesn't have custody or control,
but all of those that are doctrines that are applied to
either government cases, cases against governmental
defendants, or they apply to private actors who have failed
to act which is entitled to some more protection than as we
have here, an actual affirmative act
There was one other case that the defendant cited,
Doe, I believe I don't think we've seen that case I think
25
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that was cited for the first time in court today or am I
wrong?

3
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5

MR OWENS It cites the Young case
MR ORLOFSKY But that case I haven't seen that
other case that he mentioned. Your Honor, so I can't comment

1

6 on that
7
I can briefly address the collateral estoppel
8 issue Do you have any more questions on that initial
9 argument?
10
THE COURT No
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THE COURT

All right, thank you Your response

MR OWENS Your Honor, say this afternoon I go to
see my doctor and my doctor prescribes me a medication, and I
go home and I have side effects from that medication Can my
children sue my doctor7 That is this case Let's say I'm
given an antidepressant and it's going to make me grumpy at
first, so I go home and I'm grumpy, and my kids say. dang
that doctor. I'm suing you That is tnis case on a much more

9 dramatic field
10
It doesn't make sense on policy - they spent half

11
MR ORLOFSKY I'll be very brief on that one I
12 think that one's been briefed pretty well, and there are

11 their time talking about there are exceptions There are
12 exceptions I mean, if I kill my patient, my patient's
13 family can sue me If there's a loss of consortium.

13 several requirements of collateral estoppel that we feel are
14 not met. and the first is not the same parties, the second is

14 possibility where I'm not the direct patient and I have a

15 not the same issue, and the third is the issue was not

15 claim There are statutory things There are mental health

16 litigated
17

16 things If I tell my therapist I'm going to go home and kill
Let me just focus on the fact that we don't have

17 my wife, my therapist -- there's confidentiality there's all

18 the same party here It's one thing to talk about equitable
19 considerations but we have a very clear test for collateral

18 kinds of privileges
19
THE COURT Instead of giving me all these
20 hypothetical, why don't you address the specific legal

20 estoppel, and that is you need to be the same party I don't
21 think anyone is claiming that the plaintiffs here were

21
22
23
24
25

22 parties to the criminal proceeding The victims right
23 statute gives them a right to chat with the prosecutor to
24 provide input, but no one has said that that makes you a
25 party

points that counsel has made
MR OWENS Okay I never heard custody and
control It's my whole argument The Young case does not
say if you are a government actor It says control over or
custody of the primary person who caused the injury is the

26

28

1
There is an exception You don't have to be a
2 party if you dfe in privity with a party And privity has
3 been defined pretty clearly by the Supreme Court In the BYU

1
2
3

necessary prerequisite before engaging in a
foreseeability-of-harm analysis The Doe case which we just
in preparation for this hearing just did a WestLaw thing on

4 versus Tremco case that we've just cited, privity basically
5 means you have to have the identical interest So your

4

whose side ~

6

claim, your interests were fully litigated in that prior

5

7

proceeding And the examples they've given of that are a

6
7

8

guardian and a ward, a trustee and a beneficiary, corporate

8

9

affiliates like a parent and a subsidiary So if the

9

10 subsidiary is in a lawsuit, the parent can't come in and say

THE COURT

I will say I have not received that I

haven't seen that, and I would never have viewed it coming
this late at the conclusion of briefing
MR OWENS

Fair enough Enough to say it's the

LDS church being sued for a sex member -- a member who's

10 committed a sex crime, and they quote the Young language

11 we want to relitigate that issue again You were in the same

11 oerfectly, and that's not a government actor

12 shoes as the party that was litigating

12

13

15 State They're trying to prosecute crimes, make sure there

13 control, custody and control The Cruz case I acknowledge
14 does not say that I was a clerk for justice Howe when that
15 was written I recall it doesn't say that, but I think it

16 is punishment, make sure the State's interests are taken care

16 would be decided under a little different standard today I

17 of The victims have a whole set of different interests

17 mean, those words aren't used in the Cruz case, but they are
18 used m the most recent cases that are close to our case
19
THE COURT So your argument is I should disregard
20 controlling law because more recent controlling law says

You can't say that with the victim of a crime and

14 the prosecution The prosecution's interests are for the

18 They may overlap, both people may be interested in a
19 conviction, but you cannot say that the victims of a crime
20 have the identical interests with the prosecution, and no
21 case that I'm aware of has ever said anything remotely like
22 that
23
Again, we'll stand on our briefs on the other two
24 points of collateral estoppel, but I'll leave it at that
25 point That point I think they don't get past
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The last several cases talk about custody and

something different without overruling Cruz is your argument
MR OWENS Right I think these are much closer
cases -- these are cases that have dealt with the special
relationship duty in much more detail than that case did
And I could say. well, the car dealership had custody and
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control over their cars that [hey keep leaving keys in. but
the fact is that wording is not -- does not appear to be
important in Cruz whereas it does in these most recent
cases
And I think they just -- well. I'd be speculating
on why the Supreme Court has focused that analysis, but I
think they focused that analysis It's not enough just to
say foreseeability You've got to have some control, which
makes per sense If I am a patient and I go harm someone,
for that person to harm they have to show that the health
care provider actually had some control, and that's why you
get into prisoners and mental patients because there's
custody and control issues there
THE COURT Which fits right in with opposing
counsel's argument that that's a unique category of cases
MR OWENS Well. I don't see in the cases where it
talks about this is only for government, but the fact is the
only people who generally have custody and control over
people are government entities unless --1 guess I couid
civilly commit my patient, and then under that scenario if I
decide to let my patient out
I guess I'm getting a little off track here, but my
whole argument is there's no custody and control How can -what do we expect my client to do? She's got a troubled guy
who's got some mental health issues, so. oh. boy. I think
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he's going to harm someone I'm going to arrest him I
mean, we don't do that She prescribes medications that will
help knowing she could be sued by that patient Mr Ragsdale
is not unhappy with his care evidently, and that's my live
patient That's who I owe my duty to It's a real stretch
to say because his kids are unhappy they can sue
With regard to the family - excuse me, the victims
rights privity issue. I believe this Court has authority
under an equitable basis to say that issue was fully
litigated
THE COURT You're barking up the wrong tree there
I don't see it Don't go there
MR OWENS I li reject tnat, and I'll assert tne
victims rights statutes permitting and requiring tneir
cooperation and in this case their assent So it wasn't like
they just had input They affirmatively agreed -THE COURT That was the grandparents They were
not conservators
MR OWENS We're essentially saying the convicted
fefon who says the medications did not make me do it could be
overturned in a civil proceeding by saying the medications
made him do it That's contrary. I think, to iaw, to
judicial economy, to everything And, you know, I guess I
could bring in Ragsdale. I could bring in the State of Utah
and have them kind of defend what they did there in this

lawsuit, but the faa is tnat was fully litigated with much
more severe -- here we're just talking about money Tnere
we're talking about potential capital murder charges, so
pretty big incentives
And I know it's just contrary to --1 think we're
going to end up witn if they were to prevail basically it
puts his conviction in question and subject to review on a
petition I don't think that's their goal The family was
delighted when he stood there and took full responsibility
for this murder and declared such I mean -- anyway. I'll
submit it on those things Thank you Your Honor
THE COURT Thank you Give me a few minutes to
kind of organize my thoughts, and I'll be back
(Whereupon, a recess was taken)
THE COURT This is an incredibly interesting case,
and it's one that has mentally required me to delve a bit
into the, you know, look at the case law out also consider
the policy judgments, the policy issues that underlie the
legal direction
At the end of the day. I am persuaded that the
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted And for me. it
really does hinge on the fact that there is no
provider-patient relationship here between these particular
providers and either the children or their conservator And
in my judgment, much as in the case of Joseph, the existence
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of that relationship was dispositive I believe it is
dispositive here And I just have to say that I'm not
persuaded by plaintiff's argument that they can somehow all
that they need to do is establish that there is a
relationship, a doctor-patient relationship that existed out
there between Ragsdale and the providers and that that's
enough for them to then somehow step into that for purposes
of triggering a duty analysis I just don't see it I may
be wrong, and the appellate court may tell me so. but I don't
believe that they can step in -- that the conservator or the
children can steo into Mr Ragsdale's shoes for pjrposes of
asserting that And notably Mr Ragsdale isn't here
I m also not persuaded oy the citation to the
malpractice act That does not lead me to the inference that
plaintiffs would have me draw To be sure, the statute of
limitations language acknowledges that somebody other than a
patient can bring an action, but as has been noted, there are
contexts under which somebody else that's been injured may
sue, but nothing in there addresses or vitiates the duty to
establish a duty -- vitiate the need for establismng a duty
to the individual
And if I were to reach the issue of summary
judgment, I frankly would deny a summary judgment because I
am not persuaded that we have nere privity and identity So
the fact that the grandoarents were consulted and agreed, I

don't believe that that is binding in any event on the
conservator And even with their agreement, their agreement
is not binding -- they are entitled to be consulted, they're
entitled to provide input as representatives of the victim's
children, but their decision would have not been binding on
the prosecutor and the actions the prosecutor would have
taken And so were I not persuaded that the duty issue makes
this matter fall, I would have held that summary judgment
also should be denied, but anyway So that's my ruling
And I will admit that there is an issue around the
language of Cruz, and that is, you know, that language has
not been removed, but I think more recent case law I do find
it persuasive that more recent case law, focused in a more
tailored manner in more analogous type of situations requires
that relationship, that duty of relationship there
(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at
2 50 p m )

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

34

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20.
21
22
23
24
25

TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH )
)ss:
COUNTY OF IRON)

I, MARY BETH COOK, A CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER IN tHE
STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED PROCEEDINGS WERE TRANSCRIBED BY ME
FROM AN AUDIO AND/OR VIDEO RECORDING FURNISHED BY THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA
THAT THE FOREGOING PAGES REPRESENT THE COMPL ETE
TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY HAT
WERE HELD ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2010, AND THAT SAID
TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS ALL OF THE AUDIBLE TESTIMONY, OBJECTIONS
OF COUNSEL AND RULINGS OF THE COURT
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT I AM NOT A RELATIVE OR
EMPLOYEE OF ANY OF THE PARTIES OR COUNSEL INVOLVED IN SAID
ACTION, NOR A PERSON FINANCIALLY INTERESTED IN THE ACTIOIP
DATED MARCH 15, 2011.

Y^G**&**V-(WCMary Beth tfoSk7<-bK, KHK "
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